Abstract. Coin flipping is a cryptographic primitive for which strictly better protocols exist if the players are not only allowed to exchange classical, but also quantum messages. During the past few years, several results have appeared which give a tight bound on the range of implementable unconditionally secure coin flips, both in the classical as well as in the quantum setting and for both weak as well as strong coin flipping. But the picture is still incomplete: in the quantum setting, all results consider only protocols with perfect correctness, and in the classical setting tight bounds for strong coin flipping are still missing. We give a general definition of coin flipping which unifies the notion of strong and weak coin flipping (it contains both of them as special cases) and allows the honest players to abort with a certain probability. We give tight bounds on the achievable range of parameters both in the classical and in the quantum setting.
Introduction
Coin flipping (or coin tossing) as a cryptographic primitive has been introduced by Blum [5] and is one of the basic building blocks of secure two-party computation [21] .
Coin flipping can be defined in several ways. The most common definition, sometimes called strong coin flipping, allows two honest players to receive a uniform random bit c ∈ {0, 1}, such that a dishonest player cannot increase the probability of any output. A dishonest player may, however, abort the protocol, in which case the honest player gets the erasure symbol ∆ as output 3 . A weaker definition, called weak coin flipping, only requires that each party cannot increase the probability of their preferred value.
Without any additional assumptions, unconditionally secure weak coin flipping (and therefore also strong coin flipping) cannot be implemented by a classical protocol. This follows from a result by Hofheinz, Müller-Quade and Unruh [9] , which implies that if two honest players always receive the same uniform bit, then there always exists one player that can force the bit to be his preferred value with certainty.
If the players can communicate using a quantum channel, unconditionally secure coin flipping is possible to some extent. The bounds of the possibilities have been investigated by a long line of research. Aharanov et al. [1] presented a strong coin flipping protocol where no quantum adversary can force the outcome to a certain value with probability larger than 0.914. This bound has been improved by Ambainis [2] and independently by Spekkens and Rudolph [18] to 0.75 (see also [8] for a different protocol). For weak coin flipping, Spekkens and Rudolph [19] presented a protocol where the dishonest player cannot force the outcome to its preferred value with probability larger than 1/ √ 2 ≈ 0.707. (Independently, Kerenidis and Nayak [10] showed a slightly weaker bound of 0.739.) This bound has further been improved by Mochon, first to 0.692 [13] and finally to 1/2 + ε for any constant ε > 0 [15] , therefore getting arbitrarily close to the theoretical optimum. For strong coin flipping, on the other hand, this is not possible, since it has been shown by Kitaev [11] (see [3] for a proof) that for any quantum protocol there is always a player able to force an outcome with probability at least 1/ √ 2. Chailloux and Kerenidis [6] showed that a bound of 1/ √ 2 + ε for any constant ε > 0 can be achieved, by combining two classical protocols with Mochon's result: They first showed that an unbalanced weak coin flip can be implemented using many instances of weak coin flips, and then that one instance of an unbalanced weak coin flip suffices to implement a strong coin flip with optimal achievable bias.
Limits of previous Results
In all previous work on quantum coin flipping, honest players are required to output a perfect coin flip, i.e., the probability of both values has to be exactly 1/2, and the players must never disagree on the output or abort. However, in practice the players may very well be willing to allow a small probability of error even if both of them are honest. Furthermore, a (quantum) physical implementation of any protocol will always contain some noise and, therefore, also some probability to disagree or abort. This requirement is, therefore, overly strict and raises the question how much the cheating probability can be reduced when allowing an error of the honest players.
It is well-known that there exist numerous cryptographic tasks where allowing an (arbitrarily small) error can greatly improve the performance of the protocol. For example, as shown in [4] , the amount of secure AND gates (or, alternatively, oblivious transfers) needed between two parties to test equality of two strings is only O(log 1/ε) for any small error ε > 0, while it is exponential in the length of the inputs in the perfect case. Considering reductions from oblivious transfer to different variants of oblivious transfer where the players can use quantum communication, it has recently been shown that introducing a small error can reduce the amount of oblivious transfer needed by an arbitrarily large factor [20] .
It can easily be seen that some improvement on the achievable parameters must be possible also in the case of coin flipping: In any protocol, the honest players can simply flip the output bit with some probability. This increases the error, but decreases the bias. In the extreme case, the two players simply flip two independent coins and output this value. This prohibits any bias from the adversary, at the cost of making the players disagree with probability 1/2.
The only bounds on coin flipping we are aware of allowing for an error of the honest players have been given in the classical setting. An impossibility result for weak coin flipping has been given in [9] . Nguyen, Frison, Phan Huy and Massar presented in [17] a slightly more general bound and a protocol that achieves the bound in some cases.
Contribution
We introduce a general definition of coin flipping, characterized by 6 parameters, which we denote by CF(p 00 , p 11 , p 0 * , p 1 * , p * 0 , p * 1 ) .
The value p ii (where i ∈ {0, 1}) is the probability that two honest players output i and the value p * i (p i * ) is the maximal probability that the first (second) player can force the honest player to output i. With probability 1 − p 00 − p 11 , two honest players will abort the protocol and output a dummy symbol. 4 This new definition has two main advantages:
-It generalizes both weak and strong coin flipping, but also allows for additional types of coin flips which are unbalanced or lay somewhere between weak and strong. -It allows two honest players to abort with some probability.
We will first consider classical protocols (Section 3), and give tight bounds for all parameters. The impossibility result (Lemma 5) uses a similar proof technique as Theorem 7 in [9] . In combination with two protocols showing that this bound can be reached (Lemma 4), we obtain the following theorem. 
For weak coin flipping, i.e., p * 1 = 1 and p 0 * = 1, the bound of Theorem 1 simplifies to the condition that p 00 ≤ p * 0 , p 11 ≤ p 1 * , and
which is the bound that is also implied by Theorem 7 in [9] .
In Section 4, we consider the quantum case, and give tight bounds for all parameters. The quantum protocol (Lemma 10) bases on one of the protocols presented in [6] , and is a classical protocol that uses an unbalanced quantum weak coin flip as a resource. The impossibility result follows from the proof of Kitaev's bound on quantum strong coin flipping (Lemma 11). Our results, therefore, give the exact trade-off between weak vs. strong coin flipping, between bias vs. abort-probability, and between classical vs. quantum coin flipping. (Some of these trade-offs are shown in Figures 1 and 2 .) They imply, in particular, that quantum protocols can achieve strictly better bounds if p 0 * + p 1 * > 1 and p * 0 + p * 1 > 1. Outside this range classical protocols attain the same bounds as quantum protocols.
If these bounds are not satisfied then there does not exist a quantum protocol for
Since the optimal quantum protocol is a classical protocol using quantum weak coin flips as a resource, the possibility to do weak coin flipping, as shown by Mochon [15] , can be seen as the crucial difference between the classical and the quantum case. 
The value p * is the maximal probability that any player can force the coin to be a certain value, and a is the abort probability. Therefore, the smaller p * for a fixed value of a, the better is the protocol. The definition of coin flipping (Definition 1) implies that p * ≥ (1−a)/2. Hence, the theoretically optimal bound is p * = (1 − a)/2. In the quantum case, the optimal achievable bound is p * = (1 − a)/2. In the classical case the optimal achievable bound is p * = 1 − a/2 for a < 1/2 and the same as the quantum bound for a ≥ 1/2. The best previously known classical lower bounds from [9, 17] was p * ≥ 1 − √ a.
Preliminaries
In a classical protocol, the two players (Alice and Bob) are restricted to classical communication. Both players are given unlimited computing power and memory, and are able to locally sample random variables from any distribution. In a quantum protocol, the two players may exchange quantum messages. They have unlimited quantum memory and can perform any quantum computation on it. All operations are noiseless. At the beginning of the protocol, the players do not share any randomness or entanglement. While honest players have to follow the protocol, we do not make any assumption about the behaviour of the malicious players. We assume that the adversary is static, i.e., any malicious player is malicious from the beginning. Furthermore, we require that the protocol has a finite number of rounds. -If both players are honest, then they output the same value i ∈ {0, 1} with probability p ii and ∆ with probability 1 − p 00 − p 11 .
4
-For any dishonest Alice, the probability that Bob outputs 0 is at most p * 0 , and the probability that he outputs 1 is at most p * 1 . -For any dishonest Bob, the probability that Alice outputs 0 is at most p 0 * , and the probability that she outputs 1 is at most p 1 * .
Definition 1 generalizes the notion of both weak and strong coin flips and encompasses, in fact, the different definitions given in the literature.
-A perfect weak coin flip is a
-A perfect strong coin flip is a
-The weak coin flip with error ε > 0 of [15] is a
-The strong coin flip of [6] is a
Note that CF(p 00 , p 11 , p 0 * , p 1 * , p * 0 , p * 1 ) can also be defined as an ideal functionality that is equivalent to the above definition. Such a functionality would look like this: If there is any corrupted player, then the functionality first asks him to send a bit b ∈ {0, 1} that indicates which value he prefers. The functionality then flips a coin c ∈ {0, 1, ∆}, where the probabilities depend on b and on which player is corrupted. For example, if the first player is corrupted and b = 0, then c = 0 will be chosen with probability p * 0 , c = 1 with probability min(p * 1 , 1 − p * 0 ) and ∆ otherwise. The functionality then sends c to the adversary, and the adversary chooses whether he wants to abort the protocol or not. If he does not abort, the honest player receives c (which might already be ∆), and ∆ otherwise. If none of the players are corrupted, the functionality chooses a value c ∈ {0, 1, ∆} which takes on i ∈ {0, 1} with probability p ii and sends c to the two players.
Classical Coin Flipping

Protocols
Protocol CoinFlip1:
1. Alice flips a three-valued coin a such that the probability that a = i is p i * for i = {0, 1}, and a = ∆ otherwise. She sends a to Bob. Proof. If p 0 * + p 1 * ≤ 1, they use Protocol CoinFlip1. (If p * 0 + p * 1 ≤ 1, they exchange the role of Alice and Bob.) By construction, a malicious Bob cannot bias Alice's output by more than p i * , and a malicious Alice cannot bias Bob's output by more than p * i . Honest players output the value 0 with probability p 0 * p * 0 and 1 with probability p 1 * p * 1 .
⊓ ⊔ Protocol CoinFlip2: Parameters: p, x 0 , x 1 , y 0 , y 1 ∈ [0, 1].
1. Alice flips a coin a ∈ {0, 1} such that a = 0 with probability p and sends it to Bob. 
then there exists a classical protocol implementing CF(p 00 , p 11 , p 0 * , p 1 * , p * 0 , p * 1 ).
Proof. We use Protocol CoinFlip2 and choose the parameters
Note that if p = 1 then y 0 is undefined (and the same holds for y 1 if p = 0), but this does not cause any problem since in this case the parameter y 0 is never used in the protocol. We now verify that these parameters are between 0 and 1. We have
To see that p lies indeed in this interval, note that the upper bound follows from
For the lower bound, note that
where we have used that
It follows that p, x 0 , x 1 , y 0 , y 1 ∈ [0, 1]. If both players are honest, then the probability that they both output 0 is
The probability that they both output 1 is
If Alice is malicious, she can bias Bob to output value i either by sending i as first message hoping that Bob does not change the value, which has probability x i = p * i ; or by sending the value 1 − i hoping that Bob changes the value, which occurs with probability 1 − x 1−i = 1 − p * 1−i ≤ p * i . Hence, she succeeds with probability p * i .
Bob can bias Alice to output value i by sending b = i independently of what Alice had sent as first message. For i = 0, Alice will accept this value with probability
and for i = 1 with probability
⊓ ⊔
In order to show that all values with p 00 + p 11 below the bound given in (1) can be reached, we will need additionally the following lemma. Proof. P ′ is defined as follows: The players execute protocol P . If the output is i ∈ {0, 1}, then Alice changes to ∆ with probability 1 − p ′ ii /p ii . If Alice changes to ∆, Bob also changes to ∆. Obviously, the cheating probabilities are still bounded by p 0 * , p 1 * , p * 0 , p * 1 , which implies that that protocol P ′ implements a CF(p 
Proof. If p 0 * +p 1 * > 1 and p * 0 +p * 1 > 1, then Lemmas 2 and 3 imply the bound. Otherwise, i.e., if either p 0 * + p 1 * ≤ 1 or p * 0 + p * 1 ≤ 1, then max(0, p 0 * + p 1 * − 1) max(0, p * 0 + p * 1 − 1) = 0 and the bound is implied by Lemmas 1 and 3. ⊓ ⊔
Impossibilities
The following lemma shows that the bounds obtained in Lemma 4 are optimal. The proof uses the same idea as the proof of Theorem 7 in [9] . 
Proof. We can assume that the output is a deterministic function of the transcript of the protocol. This can be enforced by adding an additional round at the end of the protocol where the two players tell each other what they are going to output. Since we do not require the protocol to be efficient, Lemma 7 in [9] implies that we can also assume that the honest parties maintain no internal state except for the list of previous messages.
For any partial transcript t of a protocol, we define p t 0 * as the maximum over all transcripts starting with t, i.e., the maximum probability with which Bob can force Alice to output 0, given the previous interaction has given t. In the same way, we define p t 1 * , p t * 0 , p t * 1 . We define p t 00 and p t 11 as the probabilities that the output of the honest players will be 00 and 11, respectively, given the previous interaction has given t. We will now do an induction over all transcripts, showing that for all t, we have For complete transcripts t, each honest player will output either 0, 1 or ∆ with probability 1 and we always have p Let t now be a partial transcript, and let Alice be the next to send a message. Let M be the set of all possible transcripts after Alice has sent her message. For the induction step, we now assume that the statement holds for all transcript in M , and show that then it must also hold for t. Let r i be the probability that an honest Alice will choose message i ∈ M . By definition, we have
For j ∈ {0, 1} it holds that 
Quantum Coin Flipping
Protocols
An unbalanced weak coin flip with error ε WCF(z, ε) is a CF(z, 1 − z, 1, 1 − z + ε, z + ε, 1), i.e., a coin flip where Alice wins with probability z, Bob with probability 1 − z and both cannot increase their probability to win by more than ε. (They may, however, decrease the probability to 0.) Let WCF(z) := WCF(z, 0). It has been shown by Mochon [15] that weak coin flipping can be implemented with an arbitrarily small error.
Theorem 3 (Mochon [15] ). For any constant ε > 0, there exists a quantum protocol that implements WCF(1/2, ε).
In [14] , Mochon showed that quantum coin-flipping protocols compose sequentially. Implicitly using this result, Chailloux and Kerenidis showed that an unbalanced weak coin flip can be implemented from many instances of (balanced) weak coin flips.
Proposition 1 (Chailloux, Kerenidis [6] ). For all z ∈ [0, 1], there exists a classical protocol that uses k instances of WCF(1/2, ε) and implements WCF(x, 2ε), for a value x ∈ [0, 1] with |x − z| ≤ 2 −k .
The following lemma shows that the parameter z can be slightly changed without increasing the error much.
